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ARE VARIABLE ANNUITIES THE 
ANSWER TO INFLATION? 
PAUL W. M C ~ C K E N  
THE MAJOR REASON for interest in variable annuities stems from the 
possibility that they would provide one answer to the problem of 
hedging against price inflation. Two questions are, of course, in- 
volved. Would these, in fact, provide a reasonably adequate hedge 
against inflation? Is the prospect for chronic price infiation serious 
enough to warrant this substantial departure from financial ortho- 
doxy? 
I 
The issues involved in this first question have been at the focus of 
many discussions in the financial community. Two or three conclu- 
sions seem obvious. Funds invested in fluctuating-price assets will 
provide substantially more of a hedge against inflation than those 
invested in more orthodox ways. The hedge is not perfect, and indi- 
vidual situations could certainly arise where the results would work 
out badly. Stock prices and the cost of living do move conversely at 
times. The timing of benefit payments may be adverse. The selec- 
tion of individual securities may be sufficiently unfortunate so that 
a portfolio might behave worse than stock averages. 
These are, however, questions which must be explored by those 
closer to the specific problems which the financial industry might 
face if it were to move actively in this direction. My comments here 
will be largely confined to the second question, i.e., what are the 
longer-run price-level prospects? This, of course, is a fundamental 
question, and how it is answered importantly determines whether 
these other matters are academic or real-life considerations. 
I1 
In the considerable amount of postwar discussion of price-level 
prospects, six reasons have emerged for expecting that we are in an 
“age of inflation,” with the long-run trend of the dollar’s purchasing 
power declining? 
University of Michigan 
1. The phrase is  from a series of articles on “Agenda for the Age of Inflation” begin- 
ning in the Economist (August 18, 1951). Much of the material in this section appeared 
in an article “Is Price Inflation Inevitable?” Lfzkhigan Blcsiness Review (September, 
1955). 
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1. The Ionger-run history of the price level itself suggests this 
prospect. A chart of wheat prices in England, developed by Warren 
and Pearson, shows a rising trend from 1500 to about 1800, at 
which time wheat prices were ten times the level roughly three cen- 
turies eaxlier? This chart suggests that the declining price-level 
trend of the nineteenth century was, like the one for a century fol- 
lowing 1650, an interim reversal of a rising trend. 
More recent trends are even more disturbing. The price level in 
this country has been demonstrating an entirely new resistance to 
downward pressure. After other major wars the price level declined 
substantially and (with the exception of World War I) regained the 
prewar level. By 1816 the price level was below 1812; and by 1879 
it was below 1861.8 Even after World War I1 the price level stabi- 
lized at roughly one-fifth below the 1920 peak? 
This contrasts sharply with our experience after World War 11. 
There has been no “postwar decline,” and even in the two postwar 
recessions, the price level was remarkably unresponsive to down- 
ward pressures. During the 1949 recession the wholesale price index 
declined 4 per cent, and in 1954 about 1 per cent. And the consumer 
price index for the recession year of 1954 averaged slightly higher 
than 1953. 
The experience in other countries is even more striking, Since 
1948, apart from a few exceptions (e.g., Belgium, Switzerland, and 
West Germany), most countries have experienced continued price 
rise greater than in the United States. 
2. The great over-riding political and social objective of full em- 
ployment is also felt by many to be inflationary. For one thing, it 
would suggest that we would not get the recession which would undo 
the price increases of the prior boom. Thus the price trend, and per- 
haps also business conditions generally, would resemble a stairstep 
pattern-rises during prosperities interrupted by intervening hori- 
zontal movements. 
One problem here is the argument that is certain to develop about 
how full employment must be to be full. Employment in 1955, for 
2. George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, Gold and Prices (New York: Wiley, 
1935), p. 438. 
3. According to the wholesale price index. The cost-of-living index of the Federal Re- 
serve Bank of New York after the Civil War never dropped back to the 1861 level. At 
the low point (1894-95) the index remained 16 per cent above the 1861 level. Cf. His- 
torical Statistics of the United States, 1889-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the 
Census, 1949), pp. 234-35. 
4. As measured by the consumer price index. The more volatile wholesale index stabi- 
lized at 35 per cent below 1920. 
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example, will average about three million over 1954; the length of 
the work week in manufacturing will exceed the 1950-52 average; 
and unemployment is estimated at just over 3 per cent of the labor 
force. Yet the question has been raised about whether the recovery 
from 1954 has been adequate. One result of all this could be to put 
the economy under forced draft to the point of generating real infla- 
tionary pressures in order to eliminate unemployment which does 
not actually exist. 
3. A slowly rising price level would have certain advantages. It 
would, for example, permit a larger output. Even at relatively high 
levels of output, production can usually be stepped up more by put- 
ting the economy under a bit of forced draft. Even if this produces 
inflationary pressures, it would obviously mean more output. Since 
the amount of real output produced is a better measure of the econ- 
omy’s contribution to welfare than movements in the price index, 
putting the economy under pressure to produce at absolute capacity 
rates (even at the cost of some inflation) would seem to be in line 
with our economic welfare. This is the view which Professor Hansen 
developed earlier this year in testimony before the Joint Congres- 
sional Committee on the Economic Report? 
4. A certain amount of inflationary pressure has been “built in” 
to our economy. An obvious illustration has to do with the auto- 
matic escalators incorporated into many labor cntracts. In theory 
these provisions need not be inflationary. In  practice they are apt to 
be. 
One of the “escalators7’ provides for automatic increases in wage 
rates for the estimated increase in the nation’s productivity or out- 
put per man hour. But this is not a completely unambiguous con- 
cept, and there can be and are differences about how to measure this 
and what the results are. Where such differences exist, it is almost 
inevitable that union negotiators are going to press for a figure on 
the high side of the probable range. 
Moreover, a part of the aggregate improvement in productivity 
arises out of a shift from low to high productivity industries. With 
such a shift, the na.ti0n7s output per man hour increases even if pro- 
ductivity within each line of industry were to remain constant. If 
then wage rates are escalated upward by the increase in over-all 
productivity, cost levels must obviously rise! According to Mr. 
5. Alvin H. Hansen, “Economic Growth and Inflation,” Commerciul and Financial 
6 .  Cf. Jules Backman, “Wage-Productivity Comparisons,’J Zndwstrkrl und Lubor Re- 
Chronicle (February 24, 1955), p. 20. 
Ltions Review (October, 19541, pp. 49-47. 
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Kendrick, whose figures have been widely quoted, output per man 
hour has increased 2.1 per cent per year in the private economy, of 
which 0.27 per cent was accounted for by the farm-to-non-farm 
shift of the labor force? 
Even cost-of-living escalation may be inflationary, if at the time 
escalation is adopted prices are out of equilibrium (on the low side) 
relative to costs. The subsequent upward adjustment of prices to 
costs would then trip off a rise in wages rates, another rise of prices, 
etc. Furthermore, differences of opinion can arise as to whether or- 
thodox price indexes are accurately reflecting “true” price-level 
movements. With wage rate changes now based in part on move- 
ments in these indexes we must certainly expect recurring argu- 
ments about whether these indexes are understating cost of living 
changes. 
5. The major reason for concern about the long-run price level, 
of course, has to do with whether annual “rounds” of wage increases 
will be too large to be compatible with stable costs and prices. Over- 
all productivity is generally assumed to be improving at the rate of 
2 to 3 per cent per year. If labor contracts result in wage increases 
substantially in excess of this figure, persistent upward pressure on 
cost-price levels will be the result.* We must then make a hard 
choice between a persistent deterioration in the purchasing power of 
the dollar or sufficient unemployment to neutralize the power of or- 
ganized labor to exact these increases. 
Our postwar experience is somewhat less than reassuring on this 
matter. Since 1946 hourly earnings in manufacturing have risen at 
the rate of 6.2 per cent per year, at least double the rate at which 
productivity is assumed to be increasing? And negotiations in 1955 
have produced new contracts calling for an increase of roughly 10 
per cent in some key industries. Here clearly is a major new force in 
the American economy. 
6. Curiously, one of the more obvious and important reasons for 
concern about the long-run price level is one of the less frequently 
7. John W. Kendrick, “National Productivity and Its Long-Term Projection” in 
Long-Range Economic Projection (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954), p. 
94. The farm-to-non-farm shift accounts for only a part of the inter-industry shift di- 
mension. The 2.1 per cent is derived from a trend for the years 1909-41, but the trend 
fits postwar years reasonably well. 
8. A particularly careful exploration of this whole problem can be found in Sumner H. 
Schlichter, “Do Wage Fixing Arrangements in the American Labor Market Have an In- 
flationary Bias?” American Economic Review (Proceedings, May, 1954), pp. 322-45. 
9. And the rise in total wage costs @er hour has undoubtedly been somewhat greater 
than this because of the relatively greater incidence of fringe benefits. 
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mentioned-the possibility of war, or at least recurring d E m y  op- 
erations on a limited scale. Most major price inflations in this coun- 
try have been associated with wars. The Korean military operation 
produced a 15 per cent permanent increase in the American price 
level. 
What the nature of these matters may be in the future may well 
be no clearer to financial people than it apparently is to those in the 
diplomatic or military professions. What is clear is that financial 
policies based on the assumption that wars shall be no more are a 
little less than completely realistic. 
I11 
In spite of the very persuasive case which can be made for the 
view that a rising price level is inevitable, the case is not completely 
established. There are some things to say on the other side. 
1. The history of prices is not, I think, particularly conclusive. In  
the nineteenth century the price-level trend was down, as it was in 
the seventeenth century. Price movements are the resultant of price- 
making forces. An analysis of the way these forces will probably 
work themselves out in the future gets us closer to answering the 
question about price-level prospects than assuming that the future 
will reproduce the patterns of the past. 
2. The power-of-organized-labor argument is admittedly a strong 
one. The “excessive” wage increases in the postwar period do not, 
however, prove the case. Unions were themselves negotiating in an 
inflationary environment. This meant for them two things. They 
were under rank-and-file pressure to recoup purchasing power being 
lost by price inflation. And the ease with which businessmen knew 
they could pass along cost increases in the form of higher prices 
moderated correspondingly any inclination to resist large wage de- 
mands. Professor Morton has pointed out that unions are obviously 
always going to be pressing for large wage increases. How much 
they get will depend importantly on management’s appraisal of the 
ease with which pressures on profits from increased costs can be re- 
lieved by higher prices. And this depends importantly on whether 
purchasing power generally tends to be excessive, on fiscal and mon- 
etary policy. 
Or, to use Professor Friedman’s apt figure of speech, the postwar 
period does not tell us to what extent unions were the thermometer 
registering the heat or the furnace producing it. Would unions press 
for “excessive” wage increases even if it were known that fiscal and 
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monetary policy would hold firm and unemployment would result? 
Or how strong would management’s resistance to “excessive” wage 
increases be if they felt they could not be sure of relieving the pres- 
sure on profits by an increase in prices? The answers to these ques- 
tions are by no means certain. 
3. The advantages of a slowly rising price level are apt to be 
more apparent than real. It is doubtful, it seems to me, if persistent 
price inflation in the United States would contribute much to inter- 
national financial equilibrium. The net result would be, in all prob- 
ability, an even greater price inflation within other major countries, 
with differential rates of price-level movements continuing to pose 
exchange problems. 
More importantly it is doubtful if it would mean more output and 
a higher standard of living in the long pull. An economy under 
forced draft is an economy of labor shortages, labor hoarding, and 
a tendency for the marginal productivity of labor to decline. And 
the easy markets produced by such inflationary conditions corre- 
spondingly reduce pressures for cost-reduction measures, new prod- 
uct development, and market and product research generally. There 
are many illustrations of where improved products and retooling 
with better equipment were forced by the demise of the inflationary 
markets. 
Undoubtedly by putting the economy under forced draft the im- 
mediate result can be some increase in output. But this may come 
at the expense of slowing down those forces which work for rising 
productivity and living standards in the long run. 
4. It seems quite unrealistic to think that a slowly rising price 
level can be kept slowly rising for very long, once it is assumed to 
be a part of public policy. A major adverse dividend of price infla- 
tion is the injustice of its uneven impact on different groups. And 
the gains and losses do not correspond very closely to the relative 
importance of the contributions being made to economic activity. 
There is sufficient sensitivity to this problem of equity so that an 
age of inflation would quickly produce demands for ways to assure 
that the economic position of different groups would not be wors- 
ened. Indeed during the last decade we have had proposed, from 
eminently responsible sources, price escalation for wages, Series E 
bonds, pensions, depreciation charges, annuities, etc. 
Such widespread price-level escalation would certainly produce 
one of two results. These escalators might result in a more and more 
rapid inflation. The rise in the price level during an inflation is, of 
148 The Journal of Finance 
course, nature’s way of extinguishing excess purchasing power. But 
if the process of extinguishing the excess purchasing power sets in 
motion machinery to restore the extinguished purchasing power, 
through generalized price escalators, a price level which starts out 
rising slowly will rather quickly pick up speed. That this is so may, 
of course, lead to the opposite result-arrangements where no one 
loses (or gains) position by price inflation might stiffen public sup- 
port of basic policies needed to avoid inflation. 
IV 
These considerations lead me to certain conclusions about the 
question we are considering at this session of our Association meet- 
ings. 
1. The best objective of public policy remains a stable price level. 
The advantages of a slowly rising price level are most apt to be 
gained when there is public fear of a deflationary trend. The im- 
mediate postwar period is a classic illustration of this situation 
where a price inflation was inevitable, accompanied by pretty gen- 
eral depression-mindedness. One dividend from that whole experi- 
ence was a sharpened sensitivity to the problems inflation produces, 
and for measures to relieve these problems. An orderly, continuous 
rise in the price level in short is quite improbable. 
Moreover, whatever the short-run gains in output from putting 
the economy under pressure, the longer-run result would be a reduc- 
tion in the vitality, flexibility, and capacity for growth of the econ- 
omy. An economy always operating at the absolute top of its phys- 
ical capacity is not apt to be the one making most rapid progress 
through time. 
2. But the problem faced by the financial community is not only, 
or even perhaps primarily, what the nation’s price-level policy ought 
to be. For planning purposes, a more pressing question has to do 
with what the price level will actually do. And the reasons for ex- 
pecting an upward trend in the price level are substantial-the prob- 
ability of recurring military operations; the size of annual wage in- 
creases; the public pressures not for inflation but for programs 
which produce inflation as a side effect. I t  seems clear, therefore, 
that the financial community cannot avoid asking what the implica- 
tions for it are of a potentially inflationary economy. 
If there should arise general concern about the future of the 
price level, the financial community would have no alternative but 
to endeavor to offer assets less exposed to loss of purchasing power 
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from inflation. The reason is simply that there would be fewer tak- 
ers for conventional insurance policies, pensions, annuities, bonds, 
and other financial instruments, which achieved orthodoxy during 
an era when the purchasing power of the dollar could be assumed to 
be relatively stable in the long run. Therefore, the price of staying 
in business would be to offer to customers the kinds of instruments 
and obligations which would seem to meet the needs of the times. 
Moreover, financial institutions have not only a selfish interest in 
the matter but also a social responsibility for entrepreneuring new 
ways to assure their customers’ financial position in real terms. The 
need for an adequate provision for retirement or for death and dis- 
ability protection will be no less in an inflationary era. It is equally 
clear that currently orthodox ways of handling these problems 
would not then be adequate if we could no longer depend on the 
value of the dollar. If new ways of dealing with these problems be- 
come imperative, financial institutions must provide the leadership 
in working them out for the very obvious reason that leadership can 
hardly be expected from any other source. 
But the questions are, of course, formidable. The basic require- 
ment is that promises to pay currently stated in dollars must be re- 
stated in terms of real purchasing power. Here some difficult ques- 
tions arise and no good purpose is served by pretending they do not 
exist. 
Any price-level escalator would presumably need to work both 
ways. Would people understand this during a short-run price de- 
cline-which might well occur even on a long-run upward trend? 
Obviously a major educational problem would be involved. Yet how 
could this be undertaken without being guilty of a program to un- 
dermine further confidence in the value of money? 
Maintaining the purchasing power of a pension or insurance pol- 
icy might roughly be accomplished by adding an escalator providing 
for adjustments according to changes in the consumer price index.1° 
But how could a financial institution be sure they could live with 
such a changing and uncertain liability? 
A possible compromise would be the investment of funds in some- 
thing like common stocks with the commitment to vary out-pay- 
ments tied to the behavior of assets.ll This involves the assumption 
10. It is obvious, however, that the greater the number of people who have a h n c i a l  
stake in proving that price rise bas already occurred, the greater will be the pressures 
on the index computers to deviate from rigid technical standards-in order to prove that 
the inflation has already taken place, which would justify an upward revision in pen- 
sions, etc., which would create further infiationary pressures. 
11. As in the C.R.E.F. of the T.I.A.A. 
150 The Jouml of Finance 
that the value of these assets will fluctuate with the cost of living. 
This looks like a reasonable assumption (at least so long as it does 
not become too general practice), but it is only an assumption. 
My own guess is that if price-level problems become acute, pen- 
sion programs will need to couple a pay-as-you-go supplement to the 
regular funded pension. And ways of doing this ought to be explored 
for insurance programs also, although I have no competence in 
these technical matters and do not propose to offer any advice. 
3. The vexatious questions raised when we try to think through 
the problem of hedging against inflation lead to only one conclusion. 
The best approach is to see that the problem does not arise-that a 
persistent erosion of the dollar’s purchasing power does not take 
place. Otherwise the basic functions which financial institutions are 
designed to perform will inevitably suffer a loss of public esteem. A 
basic social function of our financial organizations is to facilitate 
thrift and the use of savings. Since savings and thrift would become 
less attractive with great uncertainty about their future value, even 
ingenious devices for adapting to inflation would only imperfectly 
do the job. 
The financial community, it seems to me, has been too complacent 
about the possibility of an age of inflation-on the theory perhaps 
that “our liabilities are also in dollars.” It is apparently not always 
clearly perceived that if we are in for a period of persistently rising 
prices the balance sheet may well be “safer” than the very life of 
the industry itself. 
Therefore, the financial community’s first attack on the problem 
of inflation should be at the source, vigorous support of strong pub- 
lic policies to preserve a reasonably stable dollar. Measures to make 
the existence of price inflation more palatable, essential as they may 
be, are not the basic answer for the financial community. 
